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How Economics Helped Shape American Judaism
* 
 
This chapter discusses the strong impact of economic forces, and changes in the economic 
environment, on American Jewish observance and American Jewish religious institutions in 
the 20
th century. Beginning with the immigrants’ experience of dramatic economic change 
between the old country and the new, it focuses on how this affected differences between 
European and American Jewish practices during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Equally dramatic upward economic mobility had implications for additional changes during 
the second half of the century. These were manifested by the development of distinctively 
American patterns of Jewish education. The relationship between Jewish education in the 
United States and the other major branches of World Jewry is discussed from an economic 
perspective. The economic underpinnings of religious intermarriage and assimilation are 
reviewed. A concluding section forecasts the future of American Judaism and Jewish 
observance in the coming decades. 
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HOW ECONOMICS HELPED SHAPE AMERICAN JUDAISM 
 
By 
Carmel Ullman Chiswick 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
 
 
The United States presents an economic environment unlike any other in the 
millennia-long experience of the Jewish people.   As the “Great Experiment” in 
democracy and religious freedom, America broke with its European roots in ways that 
greatly reduced the economic penalties imposed by society on Jews per se.   American 
Jews were subject to no special taxes and faced no laws restricting their ability to choose 
an occupation, to own property, or to enforce contracts.  Although anti-Semitism was not 
completely absent, other minority religious and ethnic/racial groups also faced challenges 
in America.  For European Jews, America was truly a land of opportunity. 
In addition to its promise of freedom, the United States participated with the rest 
of the Western world in a series of technological advances with such dramatic economic 
and social impacts that they were referred to as an industrial “revolution.”  New 
inventions made workers far more productive than they had ever been in the past, mass 
production greatly reduced the cost of manufactured goods, new modes of transportation 
supplied city dwellers with inexpensive food, and new technologies in communication 
connected people in ways that would have been unfathomable in a previous era.  The real 
wages of ordinary workers, conventionally measured as the purchasing power earned by 
working for one day or one hour, rose to unprecedented levels.   
The new technology also placed a high premium on skills, both on the factory 
floor (blue-collar workers) and in the front office (white-collar workers).  The United 
States was the first country to develop a large-scale system of colleges and universities C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
  2
that were readily accessible to many families.  The highly-educated graduates of this 
system would command a substantial wage premium throughout the 20
th century as they 
facilitated the innovation and adoption of new technologies.  Jews, with their traditional 
emphases on education and on adaptability to new opportunities, participated eagerly and 
successfully in this process.   In a country where real wages were rising for all workers, 
Jews were acquiring higher education and thus moving toward the higher end of the 
rising American wage distribution. 
This was the economic context in which American Judaism developed its own set 
of religious practices.  Judaism’s Great Tradition – Tanach, Talmud, and Rabbinic rulings 
– would not change, for this is the core that defines Judaism as a religion and Jews as a 
people.  Its European Ashkenazi traditions, however, were not immutable.  Religious 
practices that involved purchasing goods might have been too expensive for Jews in a 
Russian shtetl, but would be well within the means of even poor Jews in America.  In 
contrast, any practice that required long hours in the synagogue would be far more costly 
for a high-wage American Jew with many attractive alternatives for leisure as well as 
work activities.   These differences in the relative prices of goods and of time would be 
instrumental in altering religious practices and hence the shape of Judaism in the United 
States.  
Jewish adaptations in America included the 19
th-century split into three main 
synagogue movements (Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox) and the development of a 
wide variety of communal organizations for social and political as well as charitable 
purposes.  During the 20
th century these synagogue movements and their various 
offshoots would come to characterize a distinctively American Jewish religious identity.  C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
  3
Also during the 20
th century the emergence of Israel as a major cultural, political and 
economic center – and a focal point of Jewish life – would have important effects on the 
cost of being Jewish, and hence religious practices, in the Diaspora.   
This paper explores the economic forces that facilitated and supported these and 
other changes in American Judaism.  It deals first with the immigrant experience and 
changes in economic incentives associated with upward educational and occupational 
mobility.  It then looks specifically at how this context affected the economics of Jewish 
religious education in the 20
th century.   Within the framework of World Jewry, the 
relationship between the United States, Europe and Israel is discussed with regard to the 
comparative advantage of each community in Jewish education.  The economic 
underpinnings of assimilation in the later decades of the 20
th century is discussed next, 
viewed mainly as an unintended consequence of economic decisions made by Jewish 
immigrants and their children during their adjustment an economic environment in 
America with virtually no precedent in Jewish experience.  In conclusion, these various 
economic analyses are used to provide a forecast for the future of American Judaism. 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRANT ADJUSTMENT 
Jews, like nearly everyone else in the United States, originally came to America 
as immigrants.  The earliest Jewish immigrants had to form their own communities, but 
later immigrants could choose between joining an established Jewish community and 
forming a new one.   In either case, however, an immigrant’s primary concern would be 
to earn a living and adjust to economic circumstances in the new country.   The greater 
the difference between economic life in the old country and the new, the more difficult C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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this adjustment would be and the more likely that economic concerns would heavily 
influence other aspects of an immigrant’s new life.  
The earliest American Jewish communities were Sephardic, with members whose 
occupations in international trade and finance placed them in comfortable economic 
circumstances.
1  In the mid-19
th century, however, they were greatly outnumbered by a 
wave of Ashkenazi immigrants from German-speaking areas of Central Europe.  Many of 
the German Jewish immigrants were poor, beginning their American experience as 
itinerant peddlers and eventually working their way up the socio-economic ladder by 
expanding their retail operations.  The German Jews brought with them Ashkenazi 
traditions, often modified by changes introduced by the early Reform movement in 
Germany.  In the last decades of the 19
th century their communities were in turn 
outnumbered by the massive influx of Yiddish-speaking Jews from Russia and Eastern 
Europe, ancestors of some 95 percent of today’s American Jews.  The immigrant Russian 
Jews arrived with few assets and worked mostly as ordinary laborers, operatives and 
craftsmen, but as they and their offspring improved their economic circumstances they 
moved into a variety of occupations, including especially the professions associated with 
higher education.    
THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE 
American Jewish history is thus dominated by the story of Jewish immigrants 
making the transition from the old world to the new, always seeking opportunities to 
improve their economic condition.   In this respect they followed the well-established 
model of immigrant economic adjustment.
2   Many of the skills they found useful in the 
old country did not transfer well to the new, their English was poor and they lacked skills C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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with high market value.   As a result, they would accept low-paying jobs to support 
themselves while learning such country-specific skills.  Perhaps the most important of 
these skills was the English language, but also important were American customs 
associated with the job market, such as how to look for and land a good job, how to 
behave toward supervisors and colleagues, and how to develop efficient networks for 
finding a job or establishing a business.   Also important was knowledge useful in their 
role as consumers, such as learning the relative prices of goods and services, finding 
stores with low prices, or where and when to find the good bargains.  Although real 
wages were much higher in the United States than they had been in their countries of 
origin, new immigrants could not always command the higher wages until they had made 
these investments in US-specific skills.   
Like many other immigrant groups, Jewish immigrants established synagogue 
communities in the new country with a minimum of changes.  Storefront synagogues, or 
shteibls, were common in the poor Jewish neighborhoods, serving in effect as 
inexpensive replicas of familiar old-country synagogues.  They were places where people 
with a shared experience and history could meet, where a person could hear and speak a 
familiar language and fit into a familiar social structure, and could thus serve as an 
emotional haven in a strange, confusing world.  They also served as information 
exchanges, as a place to learn the ways of the new country and to network for a better job 
or for new customers. In this they were the Jewish counterpart of the “immigrant church” 
that plays an important role in immigrant adjustment during the early years in a new 
country.
 3  C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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Although the storefront synagogues replicated as much as possible the old-
country religious traditions of Russian Jews, there was one very important difference.   
The opportunity cost of time was very much higher in the United States than it had been 
in Europe, making every hour of synagogue attendance and home religious observance 
that much more costly.  Even newcomers in low-paying jobs were investing in work-
related skills that would raise their future earnings, thus raising the opportunity cost of 
time well above their actual wage rate.  People responded to the high value of time by 
reducing their synagogue attendance and religious ritual activities.  For many, the 
Sabbath and most holiday observances were increasingly confined to the home where 
they could be comfortably abbreviated, the main exception being the High Holy Days of 
Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur.
4       
The education of Jewish children in the immigrant neighborhoods was also 
affected by the high opportunity cost of their time.  Jewish immigrants understood that an 
important route to upward socio-economic mobility in the United States was through a 
good secular education, and they were willing to work hard and sacrifice their own 
consumption levels in order to keep their children in school.  The opportunity cost of the 
child’s time, measured as the expected payoff to this educational investment, would have 
been quite high.  In contrast, the expected payoff to an investment in Jewish education 
was much lower, in part because it would have had little effect on labor market earnings 
and in part because the immigrants overestimated the extent to which children could learn 
Judaism by simply living among other Jews.  The Jewish religious professions – rabbi, 
cantor, Hebrew teacher, shochet, mohel – were low-paying occupations and therefore 
without much prestige in the immigrant community.    An international trading system C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
  7
was developed for these skills:  an American Jewish community could send for someone 
trained in Europe who would work cheaply and consider himself well-paid, although 
after a few years he might move on to a more lucrative occupation and be replaced by 
another newcomer.   
 
AMERICANIZATION AND UPWARD MOBILITY 
Once an immigrant has had a few years to adjust and to learn about the new 
economic environment, he or she typically chooses a niche in which to build a career and 
family.
5  Sometimes this involves moving up the job ladder within a firm or industry, 
sometimes it involves establishing and building a business enterprise, and sometimes it 
involves acquiring the education needed to enter a profession.  This is a period when 
earlier investments in US-specific skills are beginning to pay off as the immigrants 
become more “Americanized.”  At the same time immigrants in this phase of their 
economic adjustment invest heavily in their chosen path, acquiring a reputation for hard 
work and long hours.  As they move out of poverty and into the middle class, the 
opportunity cost of their time is even higher than before.    
For immigrants at this stage of assimilation into the American economy, time-
intensive religious traditions were increasingly expensive.  The newly-emergent 
American lifestyles were becoming less and less complementary with the old-country 
Jewish observances that had been comfortable for people in very different circumstances.  
As the German Jews established themselves during the second half of the 19
th century, 
they founded new Ashkenazi synagogues with “reformed” practices more compatible 
with their new economic environment.
6   These reforms were influenced by the classical C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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Reform movement in Germany, which had arisen along with the rapid economic 
development of that country, but their ready acceptance by American Jews was 
encouraged by the fact that they reduced the time-intensity of Jewish religious 
observance.   
Many American Jews stopped observing kashrut, especially those living outside 
of the big-city Jewish enclave neighborhoods.  This was only partly because the scarcity 
of kosher butchers would have made the price of meat very expensive.  More 
importantly, American Jews were participating actively in an open and collegial society 
in which shared meals played an important social role.  The opportunity cost of not 
joining their non-Jewish neighbors for business lunches or social dining would have been 
quite high, thus providing a strong economic incentive to accept Reform Judaism’s 
rejection of kashrut as an “obsolete” observance. 
Reform synagogues adopted other “American” practices, greatly abbreviating the 
religious service, conducting prayers in English as well as in Hebrew, and introducing 
mixed seating with men and women together.  As these reforms gained momentum, 
imported clergy trained in European seminaries were less and less prepared to serve in 
American congregations.  As the German Jews continued to prosper in America, they 
established the Hebrew Union College to train rabbis to serve in Reform synagogues.  In 
the spirit of this new movement, the first graduation ceremony in 1883 was celebrated 
with the infamous “Trefa Banquet”, followed shortly thereafter by the formal 
establishment of Reform Judaism with its even more radical “Pittsburgh Platform”.
7 
By the time the Russian Jews moved into middle-class neighborhoods, the 
American Reform Movement was already established.  For many, joining a Reform C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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synagogue was simply another step in their Americanization process.  Others, however, 
were not comfortable with the radical ideology of that movement.  They had no difficulty 
abandoning the storefront synagogues, which they had long ago ceased to attend with any 
enthusiasm, but their new Conservative synagogues retained the use of Hebrew ritual 
even as they introduced English for translations and for a sermon.  The Conservative 
Movement did not abandon kashrut, nor did it drop the observance of Shabbat, although 
many of its individual members honored these religious laws in the breach.   
Orthodox synagogues retained many more of the old-country Ashkenazi religious 
traditions, but in many respects they were the Jewish counterpart of “immigrant 
churches.”
8  As immigrants became more fluent in English and found an economic niche 
for themselves, their time became more costly and their need for a “safe haven” less 
urgent.  As an alternative to joining an “American” congregation, however, the 
immigrant religious community might simply move its old synagogue to the new 
neighborhood.  In such cases, the synagogue service inevitably changed along with 
changes in the congregants’ circumstances.  Upward economic mobility made time-
intensive practices more costly and donations more feasible, leading to a systematic 
tendency toward substituting money for time.  Congregants were willing to maintain a 
building and hire clergy, but their own attendance at services tended to decline.  
Language study is time-intensive, so English was relied on to make the services 
“relevant” for congregants with limited Hebrew skills.  As religious practices responded 
to the new incentives, and as the members became more “American” in their lifestyles 
and sensibilities, synagogue activities were increasingly laced with a heavy dose of 
nostalgia for traditions that were inevitably disappearing from American Jewish life. C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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Immigrant churches in general rarely survive more than a generation or two.  The 
immigrants themselves, and some of their children, may continue their attachment to the 
old-country traditions, but their grandchildren have no direct ties to the old country and 
are often impatient of the nostalgia enjoyed by their elders.  In an upwardly mobile 
community, the opportunity cost of time is substantially higher for the third generation 
than for the first- and perhaps even the second-generation immigrants.  Some young 
people left for less time-intensive Conservative or Reform “American” congregations 
when they moved out of the immigrant neighborhoods, while others remained Orthodox 
only as long as their parents or grandparents survived.  Throughout the first half of the 
20
th century, the rising opportunity cost of time in the American Jewish population goes 
far toward explaining the oft-noted intergenerational progression of many American 
Jewish families from Orthodox to Conservative to Reform and the declining membership 
in Orthodox synagogues. 
Outside of the synagogues, the upwardly mobile community developed a variety 
of institutions to address the philanthropic, political and social needs of American Jewry.  
Although elsewhere these functions might be the province of the religious communities, 
this was not the case in the United States where pluralism generated a different structure 
in the religious “marketplace.”
9  In contrast to the hierarchical religious organizations 
typical in countries with a state religion, American churches and synagogues were 
characterized by congregationalism, that is, an organizational structure in which 
congregations are founded and administered by their lay membership.  Without any 
central authority, these congregations typically form umbrella organizations – 
organizations in which churches or synagogues per se are members – to serve common C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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religious interests.   The Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the United 
Synagogues of America, and the Orthodox Union were formed in the late 19
th century 
and continue to dominate American Jewish religious life to this day.   A congregationalist 
market structure also leads to the formation of para-religious organizations to serve the 
non-religious social and political needs of the religious community.  For American Jewry 
these included not only charities for support to the needy but also organizations that 
helped the socio-economic assimilation of Jewish immigrants (e.g., the Hebrew 
Immigrant Aid Society, the Anti-Defamation League), and those that reinforced ties to 
World Jewry (e.g., Jewish National Fund, the Joint Distribution Committee, Hadassah 
and other Zionist organizations).  
As noted above, during this demanding phase of their economic adjustment 
Jewish immigrants worked long and hard as they invested heavily in their business or 
profession.  The opportunity cost of their time was high, and virtually all of their 
consumption patterns changed in response.  Wherever possible, Jewish immigrants and 
their children sought to reduce the time-intensity of consumption, and Jewish religious 
observance was no exception.  For some this meant simply reducing their religious 
observance, but for most it meant religious innovations that would permit substituting 
money for time.  Even as rising wages made time more costly, rising incomes made 
financial support less difficult.  Even as American Jews spent less and less time in the 
synagogue and in home-based religious observance, they joined and supported new 
synagogues and gave generously to para-religious charities and communal organizations.  
Although American Jews were often derided as “non-observant” and “materialistic,” they C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
  12
were also following a long-standing Jewish tradition by adapting their religious practices 
to a new economic environment. 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF JEWISH EDUCATION 
Education – broadly defined – is the process of investing in human capital.  
Whether formal or informal, education provides skills useful for consumption as well as 
production.  It is also the means of transmitting the stock of human knowledge from one 
generation to the next.  Jews have always emphasized the importance of education, both 
secular and religious.  A full understanding of how economic incentives affected the 
shape of American Judaism requires an understanding of how they affected Jewish 
education. 
At the turn of the 20
th century the Yiddish-speaking immigrants from Russia and 
Eastern Europe were far more preoccupied with acquiring secular skills than they were 
with Jewish education.  The financial payoff to secular skills was very high, and there 
were many new and exciting cultural, political, and social activities to learn about.  In 
contrast, the early religious institutions that they established were familiar (if not actually 
perceived as boring) and depended mainly on a set of old-country skills that could be 
transferred successfully to the new environment.  The large difference in rates of return 
between investments in secular and Jewish human capital led invariably to a strong focus 
on the former and a marked separation between secular and religious education that 
would persist for many decades.   
Investment in secular human capital was a very high priority for Jewish 
immigrants.  For adult men this usually meant learning English and acquiring job-related C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
  13
or business skills.  Jewish women were eager students in settlement houses and learned to 
use new cookbooks and other “how-to” manuals, many of which were published in 
Yiddish.
10  Immigrant parents sent their children to the public schools and were willing to 
make great sacrifices, if necessary, to keep them there as long as possible.  Most of these 
children continued through high school, and many – especially the boys – would continue 
their education in college.   According to a survey of Jewish men taken in the year 2000, 
more than 25 percent of those born before 1940, most of whom would have been the sons 
of immigrant parents, had not only graduated from college but had also earned some 
post-graduate professional degree.
11  This is more than double the corresponding figure 
for non-Jews and is testimony to the very high priority American Jews placed on secular 
education. 
Increases in the level of secular education had far-reaching implications for the 
economic environment of American Jewry.  Schooling provided the skills that qualified 
men for higher-paying occupations, raising both incomes and the opportunity cost of 
time.  By the early post-WWII years nearly 60 percent of all Jewish men were working in 
high-level occupations, as compared to less than 25 percent of the non-Jews.     Of these, 
about one-fourth (14 percent) were professionals whose occupations would have required 
an advanced degree.   Another two-thirds (45 percent) were in managerial occupations, a 
category that includes owners who manage their own companies but not the owners of 
small “mom-and-pop” establishments.  The proportion in professional occupations would 
increase steadily for the rest of the century to more than half of the total, and the 
proportion in management would eventually decline to less than 20 percent, but together 
these high-level occupations would continue to account for about two-thirds of the C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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American Jewish male labor force.  By way of comparison, in the year 2000 less than 20 
percent of non-Jewish American men were in the professions and high-level occupations 
accounted for only about 35 percent of the total.
 12 
People in these high-level occupations have skills that place them at the upper end 
of the U.S. earnings distribution.  Many of these occupations were male-dominated until 
the later decades of the 20
th century, at which point Jewish women entered them in 
disproportionately large numbers.  Jewish women were much more likely than their non-
Jewish counterparts to have attended college, and for every cohort born after World War 
II more than 25 percent of the Jewish women (compared to about 10 percent of non-
Jewish women) went on to earn an advanced post-college degree.
13   
With the focus on acquiring secular skills that conferred upward economic 
mobility, Jewish education received much less attention.  Families had limited money 
budgets and students had limited time budgets.  The rate of return to secular education 
was large and obvious, while the economic return to a Jewish education was much less 
so.  For many immigrants Judaism was so fundamental to their self-concept that they 
simply could not imagine that it might be otherwise for their children.  Yet with little 
attention given to religious studies and not much time spent in home observances, most 
of the Jewish human capital acquired by second-generation immigrants was what they 
learned by living in an ethnically Jewish community.
14  Religious human capital acquired 
in this way was at best perfunctory; although Jewish ethnic characteristics might survive 
a subsequent move to the non-Jewish suburbs, religious knowledge was often too weak to 
be imparted to the next generation.  The grandchildren of immigrants would grow up to 
embody the classic American Jewish imbalance, with very high secular skills and very C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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low religious skills.  The marginal product of time spent in secular activities would thus 
be very much higher than in Jewish religious observance, and this in turn would induce a 
further shift in the time budget from religious to secular activities.
15    
Even as the two types of education compete with each other for resources, the 
human capital which they create can be mutually complementary.  For example, Jews 
with a strong background in religious studies, especially advanced Talmud study, often 
excel in secular studies as well.  While cause and effect have yet to be well understood, 
this is a plausible explanation for the fact that Jews faced a higher rate of return than 
other groups to investments in secular education, further reinforcing the productivity of 
investments in schooling.
16  Few American Jews, however, were prepared to carry their 
religious studies to this point, and a perfunctory Jewish education can have little 
complementarity with American secular skills. 
Gifted Jewish leaders recognized this problem early in the 20
th century and began 
working on ways to “Americanize” Jewish education.  This process had two fronts.  On 
the one hand, taking account of the secular human capital that Jewish students already 
had permitted Jewish educational methods to become more efficient.  On the other hand, 
changes in American Jewish religious practice meant that the skills required for Jewish 
observance might differ from those needed in the old country.  All three of the major 
synagogue movements developed new curricula and structures of Jewish education, 
organizing their schools with graded classrooms and developing English-language texts 
to complement the study of Hebrew.
17   
Although at first only a minority of the Jewish children acquired this education, 
by mid-century it was becoming the norm.  Most of it took place in after-school programs C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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affiliated with individual synagogues which were in turn affiliated with one of the larger 
synagogue movements.  Typically meeting three days per week, twice on a weekday 
afternoon and again on Sunday mornings, these after-school programs provided the only 
Jewish education received by most of the children in Reform and Conservative 
congregations.  Jewish day schools – that is, full-time parochial schools that provided 
both religious and secular education – were associated mostly with the Orthodox 
movement.  Day schools were most common in cities with a substantial Jewish enclave 
neighborhood.  As the immigrants assimilated and moved to the suburbs, Jewish day 
schools declined in number and enrolment until well after World War II.  The Jewish day 
school “movement” has expanded dramatically in recent decades, in part because higher 
incomes have led to an expansion of private schools in general and in part because of an 
increased concern with Jewish education in particular.  Although the proportion of 
children attending a Jewish day school is far higher among the Orthodox than the other 
movements, non-Orthodox and community-based Jewish day schools are a relatively new 
phenomenon with potentially important implications for the future of American Judaism. 
 
AMERICAN ECONOMICS AND WORLD JEWRY 
In 1880 nearly 90 percent of the world’s Jewish population was concentrated in 
the Tsarist Russian Empire, with other communities in the Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman Empires and only 2 percent in the United States.  Between 1880 until World 
War I, however, a mass migration from Russia and Eastern Europe to the United States 
significantly altered this distribution.  By the early 1930s, on the eve of World War II, 
nearly 30 percent of the world’s Jews lived in the US, another 60 percent in Europe C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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(including Russia), and the remainder scattered in smaller communities in the rest of the 
world, including the British Mandate in Palestine.   Then the Holocaust effectively 
destroyed European Jewry, and with the establishment of the State of Israel began a 
period of mass immigration of refugees from Europe and from Arab lands.  As a result, 
the United States and Israel emerged as the two dominant Jewish communities during the 
second half of the twentieth century, each of which now accounts for approximately 40 
percent of world Jewry.
18 
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN JEWRY 
As the Jewish community grew and the immigrants established an economic 
niche for themselves, Americans found themselves innovating new forms of Jewish 
observance compatible with an economic environment unlike those of the places where 
most other Jews were living.  Throughout the first half of the 20
th century, American 
Jewish practices, customs and sensibilities increasingly diverged from those of the rest of 
the world.  No matter how inward-looking Americans might be, however, they remained 
connected emotionally and traditionally to other Jews and especially to the Ashkenazi 
Jews of Europe.  American Jewish charities included the needs of poor communities 
elsewhere, and American Jews were intensely concerned with political developments that 
affected the welfare of Jews in other countries. 
International trade is especially profitable when factor prices differ across 
countries.  In the United States, the prices of material goods were generally quite low and 
the opportunity cost of time was very high, in contrast to most of the rest of the world 
where the opposite was true.  By the turn of the 20
th century American Jewry had 
developed an implicit system of international trade, exporting goods-intensive C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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commodities (usually in the form of money) to other Jewish communities in exchange for 
time-intensive services (usually in the form of human capital).  For example, American 
Jews provided financial support for yeshivas in Europe and hired their graduates, thus 
maintaining traditional Jewish institutions while avoiding the high opportunity cost of 
establishing similar schools in the United States.  American Jews also participated in the 
development of the Jewish community in Israel by contributing money that supported the 
labor provided by Jewish immigrants to Israel from other countries.    
Much as youthful challenge requires a stable authority against which to rebel, 
American Judaism could be bold in its pursuit of innovation because traditional religious 
institutions remained relatively strong in Europe.
19  For the same reason, Israeli Jews 
were also able to concentrate on secular needs and felt free to make their own innovations 
in Jewish life.  This security, reinforced by the possibility of international trade in 
religious skills, ended with the destruction of European Jewry in the Holocaust.   Apart 
from its emotional and theological impacts, the Holocaust dramatically altered the 
economic exchange patterns of World Jewry.  No longer would Europe be a source of 
religious human capital and the guarantor of continuity for ancient traditions.  If the 
ancient treasures of Jewish religious culture were to survive at all, they would have to be 
preserved by the “new” Jewish communities in the United States and Israel.   
What followed was a realignment of priorities, in which each of the three main 
synagogue movements sought to position themselves as preservers of Jewish tradition in 
an American setting.  The Reform movement became less radically rebellious against 
religious traditionalism, moving away from its German roots to a less formal, more 
individualistic synagogue culture accessible to Americans with little Jewish religious C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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education.  The Conservative movement increased its emphasis on Zionism, not only as a 
means of supporting World Jewry but also for Israel’s potential to enrich the religious life 
of American Jews.  Orthodox Judaism’s declining membership was checked and 
eventually reversed, in part because of a renewed appreciation of the value of traditional 
religion and in part because of the stimulus it received when an important remnant of 
European yeshiva life immigrated to the United States.  Unlike the case in previous 
generations when economic considerations were paramount, today’s American Jews with 
their relatively high incomes and secure identities tend to affiliate with the movement that 
best expresses their own religious temperament.  
AMERICAN JEWRY AND ISRAEL 
With the establishment of Israel as an important Jewish community, American 
Jewry found new opportunities for religious exchange.  At first this was primarily a 
matter of money, with American Jewish donations to the new State supporting its 
economic development and refugee settlement.  American financial contributions were 
also important for supporting the educational, medical and social infrastructure that 
helped Israel develop rapidly into a strong modern economy.  By the 1960s, however, 
American Jews were beginning to visit Israel in person where their Judaism was 
influenced in other ways.  When it came to Jewish human capital, Israeli Jews had a 
comparative advantage relative to American Jews for skills related to the Hebrew 
language and to biblical history and geography, whereas the Jewish education of 
Americans focused mainly on synagogue and holiday traditions developed in the 
Diaspora.  By the last decades of the 20
th century modern Hebrew had become an 
important part of the American Jewish curriculum, sometimes with a semester or two in C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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Israel but more often with an Israeli-trained teacher in America.   American synagogues 
and Hebrew Schools would be influenced by the music, art and politics of Israeli Jewry, 
and vice versa.   
With the development of Israel into a high-technology modern economy, the 
economic environment of Israeli Jews has partially converged to that of the United States, 
and this has induced a corresponding partial convergence of their Jewish practices.
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There still remain important differences.  American Jewry is a tiny minority in a large 
country, while Israeli Jewry is a large majority in a tiny country.  The United States is 
also characterized by religious pluralism with no government support for any specific 
religious group, whereas Israel is a Jewish state whose government supports several 
recognized religions.  The possibility of capturing state financial support provides an 
economic incentive for religious groups to organize into political parties, a phenomenon 
common in Israel but virtually unheard of in the United States.   
The entry of religion into the electoral system has other economic implications.   
Religious affiliation affects political outcomes, and political motives affect religious 
rhetoric.  Israel’s electoral system tends to generate many political parties and to favor 
groups in the extremes of the political spectrum, including the extremes of the religious 
spectrum.  In contrast, American pluralism tends to favor the center in both political and 
religious spheres.   In consequence, the proportion of Jews at either extreme of the 
religious spectrum, whether ultra-Orthodox or ultra-secular, is very much smaller in the 
United States than it is in Israel.  Interactions between the two communities may erode 
this distinction, especially among the ultra-Orthodox where the financial and religious 
ties are much closer than elsewhere.   Despite their growth in recent years, however, the C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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ultra-Orthodox remain a small fraction of American Jewry and are unlikely to reach the 
importance of their Israeli counterparts.   As long as the United States continues its 
separation of church and state, the large majority of American Jewry is likely to continue 
to locate itself at the center of the Jewish religious spectrum.   
 
ECONOMICS AND ASSIMILATION IN AMERICA 
Economic and social assimilation into the American mainstream was an important 
objective for Jewish immigrants and their children.  They pursued it with dedication and 
intelligence, and they achieved it in a remarkably short time.  In Europe, being a Jew was 
like having an ascribed trait that was difficult, if not impossible, to shed even for those 
who converted to another religion, married and raised their children in another faith.  
Many of the Jewish immigrants to the United States viewed their Judaism as an unwanted 
old-country artifact that they were prepared to leave behind, and in America they found 
this to be possible.  For most, however, America was a land of economic opportunity 
regardless of the fact that they were Jews.  Even as they strove for economic and social 
assimilation, few of them expected that American religious pluralism would be in any 
way a threat to Jewish continuity. 
By the end of the twentieth century assimilation was defined differently, as a loss 
of meaningful Jewish identity, and is now perceived by many to threaten the very 
survival of American Judaism.  As discussed earlier, immigrants invested heavily in their 
children’s secular education without making corresponding investments in Jewish 
education.  When these children grew up and had children of their own, they had little to 
offer in the way of parental Jewish knowledge.  Following values established in the C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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immigrant communities of their youth, many of them viewed Jewish religious ritual as a 
set of quaint old-country traditions without importance in America.  Although rising 
levels of education, occupations and earnings soon placed them comfortably in upper-
middle-class suburbs, the price of that rapid success was the loss of specifically Jewish 
human capital.   
The immigrants themselves, now grandparents, might provide the family with 
whatever Jewish tradition they could, but it will be recalled that the immigrants 
themselves tended to be self-selected for below-average attachment to religious 
traditionalism.   Moreover, children are more likely to turn to their parents as role models 
rather than their grandparents.  Thus the absence of Jewish education in one generation 
would be passed on to the next, and each successive generation would have less and less 
Jewish human capital.  Coupled with ever-higher levels of secular human capital, this 
would induce a reallocation of time away from Jewish observance in favor of secular 
pursuits, whether work or leisure.  Young Jews in later generations would either ignore 
their Judaism entirely, placing little value on it, or they would feel the need to acquire 
more Jewish education than their parents, often citing a grandparent as inspiration.  By 
the end of the 20
th century American Jews would effectively split into two groups, those 
whose Judaism was effectively lost – the fully assimilated Jews – and those whose 
Judaism was increasing in intensity and thus giving rise to a Jewish “renaissance.”
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The most visible symptom of religious assimilation is Jewish intermarriage, by 
which is meant the situation where a Jew marries a non-Jewish spouse.  In most of these 
marriages children are raised either as non-Jews or as Jews in little more than name only.  
Unlike the situation in most of Jewish history, many non-Jews in American have C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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educational, economic and social backgrounds quite similar to those of Jews.  Further, 
many of these non-Jews lack the intense anti-Semitic attitudes characteristic of European 
society and are only loosely attached to their own religions.  Most American Jews have 
many opportunities to meet non-Jewish friends, classmates and colleagues, readily 
finding possibilities for a suitable match on characteristics other than religion.  The main 
incentive to select a partner that is Jewish is to improve the efficiency of making a Jewish 
home, an important component of Jewish religious observance.  Even if both of his or her 
parents were themselves Jewish, a young person raised in a home with little or no Jewish 
observance or content is unlikely to view this as a high priority.  Religious intermarriage 
at the end of the 20
th century may thus be seen as an unintended consequence of 
educational and lifestyle choices made earlier in the century. 
The number of American Jews effectively “lost” to the community through 
religious assimilation and intermarriage is substantial, but an important minority remains 
committed to Judaism and if anything is strengthening Jewish religious culture in the 
United States.  Not every immigrant neglected their children’s Jewish education, and 
even some that did have observed their offspring choosing to “return” to Judaism.  Most 
synagogues and their schools have adapted more or less successfully to the American 
environment.  Developments in Israel fed into American Jewish life in creative ways, and 
the high comfort level of Jews in American society led to more visibility in Jewish 
observances.  Many colleges and universities have courses and even whole programs in 
Jewish Studies.  The three main synagogue movements of the last century are now joined 
by a variety of additional (or alternative) movements, including those that style 
themselves as “post-denominational” and a variety of groups that are characterized in the C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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aggregate as “ultra-Orthodox.”  This pluralism within the Jewish community is an 
important part of American Judaism’s response to the community’s economic success.   
 
AN ECONOMIC FORCAST OF THE FUTURE 
The economic environment of American Jewry during the 20
th century was one of 
rapid transition.  At the beginning most Jews were immigrant blue-collar workers, with 
little secular schooling and poor English skills.  By mid-century they had climbed out of 
poverty, raised their education levels and moved into occupations at the forefront of 
American technological progress.  At the end of the century most young adult Jews were 
third- or fourth-generation Americans, well-educated, raised in upper-middle-class 
suburban comfort and fully integrated into American society. 
American Jewish institutions were influenced not only by differences between the 
economic environment of the United States and that of other countries, but also by the 
rapidly changing economic circumstances of American Jews.  To a large extent, Jewish 
institutions were formed by, and catered to, the needs of an upwardly mobile community, 
within which there was much inequality as some advanced more rapidly than others.  
Now that the Jewish community is fairly stable at a high level of economic achievement, 
and is more homogeneous with respect to income and occupations, the older institutions 
no longer speak to its current needs.  The American Jewish community now finds itself 
adapting its synagogues and communal institutions to yet another new economic 
environment and to the new Jewish needs of its members. 
In contrast to the upward mobility of the past, the economic environment of 
today’s Jewish community appears to exhibit a large degree of intergenerational stability.  C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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Highly educated parents place a high value on the education of their own children and 
provide them with a family background that advantages them in school.  Highly educated 
parents also work in well-paying professional and managerial occupations that inevitably 
advantage their children for similar work.  People in well-paid occupations also have a 
high opportunity cost of time, an incentive to substitute in consumption away from time-
intensive activities.  In particular, they have an incentive to have fewer children and 
invest heavily in the human capital of each child.   Smaller, well-off families tend to 
invest similarly in both daughters and sons, and young adults tend to marry people with 
similar age, education, and even occupational characteristics.  Most of today’s Jewish 
families are two-career professional couples who expect their own children to grow up 
into a community with similar economic characteristics. 
For the most part, different types of human capital are mutually complementary, 
in that investment in one type raises the rate of return to investments in others.  This 
means that high levels of secular education increase not only work-related skills but also 
the incentives to invest in health, in leisure-related activities, in family-related human 
capital, and in religious skills.  American Jews are making all of these investments, and 
they can be expected to continue doing so.  Even though the current Jewish renaissance is 
important for only a minority of today’s young adult Jews, it is probably a transitional 
phase, bridging the gap between low levels of Jewish human capital in the past and 
relatively high levels in the somewhat smaller but more intensely committed American 
Jewish community of the future.  How high these future levels will be, and how many 
Jews continue to identify strongly with Judaism, depends in large part on how C. Chiswick – Shaping American Judaism 
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successfully Judaism and Jewish communal institutions can respond to the 21
st-century 
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